First order emotions form the core of the more elaborate “emotion schemas” that develop with age and learning and consist of complex combinations of emotions, cognitions, and behaviors. Other theorists take a developmental approach and argue that all infants are born with a set of “first order emotions” that are evolutionarily given reactions (including feelings, motivations and behaviors) to specific stimuli (e.g., Izard, in press). In this view, emotions can be shaped by culture and learning, but all humans possess the capacity to experience and perceive the same core set of emotion categories.
Some theorists emphasize the universal characteristics of emotion categories, suggesting that each emotion category (e.g., anger) refers to a “family” of states that share a distinctive universal signal (e.g., facial behavior), physiology, antecedent events, subjective experience, and accompanying thoughts and memories (e.g., Ekman & Cordano, in press). Despite these common assumptions, there is variability in how different researchers define emotions as natural kinds. It is assumed that these states are biologically basic and inherited, and cannot be broken down into more basic psychological components ( Izard, in press Ekman & Cordaro, in press Panksepp & Watt, in press). 2007d) of emotion is that different emotion categories refer to states with endowed motivational characteristics that drive cognition and behavior. The guiding hypothesis of this natural kind model ( Barrett 2006a) or modal model ( Barrett et al. A locationist account of the brain basis of emotionĪ locationist account of emotion assumes that the category emotion and individual categories such as anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness (and perhaps a few others) are respected by the body and brain (see Barrett 2006a for a discussion). Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: a set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.Ģ. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain–emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. In this article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the human neuroimaging literature on emotion. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science.
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